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Introduction 
 The Fourth Amendment mandates that citizens be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.1  To this end, the Supreme 
Court holds that warrantless searches and seizures are 
presumptively unreasonable.2  Despite declaring this general 
                                                        
1  The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 
206, 222 (1960) (“[T]he Constitution forbids [] not all searches 
and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.”); DARIEN A. 
MCWHIRTER, SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND PRIVACY 1 (1994) (suggesting that 
Supreme Court precedent indicates the main purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment is to protect citizen’s privacy and property). 
2 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) 
(emphasizing that searches carried out without prior judicial 
approval are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment); 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948) (voicing 
that searches and seizures require either a warrant issued by a 
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rule, the Court has carved out exceptions that give law 
enforcement officials considerable flexibility with which to 
conduct their day-to-day criminal investigations.3  One such 
exception to the warrant requirement is that police may stop and 
question an individual so long as the detaining officer has a 
reasonable belief that criminal activity may be taking place.4  
Furthermore, the Court permits this requisite reasonable 
suspicion to be based on information provided by third-party 
                                                        
magistrate or the presence of specific, exceptional 
circumstances); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 
914 (1984) (stressing the warrant preference within the context 
of searches). 
3 See generally Jason K. Bryk, Anonymous Tips to Law Enforcement 
and the Fourth Amendment:  Arguments for Adopting an Imminent 
Danger Exception and Retaining the Totality of the Circumstances 
Test, 13 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 277, 288–89 (2003) (listing 
numerous exceptions to the general warrant requirement). 
4 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (allowing police to 
conduct an investigatory stop when the detaining officer 
“observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude 
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot . 
. . .”). 
 5 
sources.5  This broad grant of power allows police substantial 
leeway to investigate potential crime. 
 While the Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to 
allow officers to act without a warrant and on less than 
probable cause, it has also identified specific limits as to the 
type and quality of information police may use.  In Florida v. 
J.L.,6 the Court unanimously recognized such a limit.7  While 
acknowledging that police may use information from third parties 
to establish reasonable suspicion, the Court clarified that 
reasonable suspicion cannot be based exclusively on a bare-boned 
                                                        
5 See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (permitting the 
use of information from a known informant who supplied the 
information in person and who had provided reliable information 
in the past); see also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 
(1990) (authorizing the use of an anonymous tip that lacked 
traditional indicia of reliability but provided substantial 
predictive information about its subject that police could to 
independently corroborate). 
6 529 U.S. 266 (2000). 
7 See id. at 274 (stating that police may not solely rely on an 
anonymous tip that has no indicia of reliability). 
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anonymous tip.8  Consequently, the Court established an 
evidentiary baseline for all future police detentions:  in order 
to use third-party information as the basis for a stop or 
search, police must first ascertain the informant’s reliability 
by either discovering the tipster’s identity or verifying 
sufficient predictive information related to the alleged crime.9  
                                                        
8 See id. (holding that an anonymous tip lacking sufficient 
indicia of reliability, without more, is insufficient to justify 
an investigatory stop and frisk).  The Court reasoned that an 
anonymous tip, such as the tip in J.L. that alleged a man was 
carrying a firearm, has none of the indicia of reliability 
available from a known source, nor provides any predictive 
information with which to verify the informant’s knowledge or 
credibility.  Id. at 268.  Thus in J.L.,“[a]ll the police had to 
go on . . . was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable 
informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor 
supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about 
J.L.”  Id. 
9 See id. at 271–72 (distinguishing the tip at issue from the one 
relied on in White by explaining that the information provided 
here could not be used to establish reliability regarding the 
alleged criminal activity, but rather could only help police 
locate and identify the accused person). 
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Where police cannot establish the informant’s identity and the 
tip does not provide anything beyond readily observable 
information, reasonable suspicion to detain the subject of the 
tip can only be formed through independent investigation of the 
alleged criminal activity.10   
 Nevertheless, the Court complicated this general rule by 
hypothesizing that police might be able to act on a lesser 
showing of reliability when an anonymous tip alleges a 
sufficiently great danger,11 but subsequently declined to expound 
on what circumstances would present such an extreme danger as to 
                                                        
10 See id. at 274 (“[W]e hold that an anonymous tip of the kind 
contemplated in Adams and White does not justify a stop and 
frisk whenever and however it alleges the illegal possession of 
a firearm.”). 
11 See id. at 273–74 (“We do not say, for example, that a report 
of a person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability 
we demand for a report of a person carrying a firearm before the 
police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.”).  However, in 
discussing this possibility under the facts of J.L., the Court 
explicitly declined to adopt an automatic firearms exception to 
the reasonable suspicion analysis because it could easily be 
abused and would likely lead to other broad exceptions.  Id. at 
272. 
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allow for modification to the usual constitutional 
requirements.12  Consequently, the Court left unanswered what set 
of facts would warrant using a bare-boned anonymous tip as the 
sole basis for initiating a seizure and search.13   
 As state and federal courts have applied the principles 
from J.L. to a variety of circumstances involving anonymous 
tips,14 one particularly troublesome area has been its 
application to anonymous tips that allege potentially 
                                                        
12 See id. at 272–73 (explaining first that “extraordinary 
dangers sometimes justify unusual precautions” and then 
suggesting that certain circumstances may provide such immense 
dangers that regular reliability considerations would not be 
required). 
13 See id. at 273 (“The facts of this case do not require us to 
speculate about the circumstances under which the danger alleged 
in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search 
even without a showing of reliability.”). 
14 E.g., United States v. Monteiro, 447 F.3d 39, 50 (1st Cir. 
2006) (holding police lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a 
traffic stop based on an anonymous tip about an alleged shooting 
where none of the allegations were independently corroborated by 
police). 
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intoxicated motorists.15  Despite a nationwide effort to increase 
public reporting of drunk drivers,16 decisions from courts across 
the country reveal that there is substantial disagreement as to 
the role these anonymous tips should play in an officer’s 
decision to initiate a traffic stop.17 
                                                        
15 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18, Virginia v. 
Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10 (2009) (No. 08-1385) (listing cases). 
16 E.g., NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., CITIZEN REPORTING OF DUI—EXTRA EYES TO 
IDENTIFY IMPAIRED DRIVING 4–5 (2006), 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/alcohol/extraeyes/images/
3204EEReport.pdf (outlining the adoption of citizen reporting 
programs nationally); NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., SAFETY STUDY:  
DETERRENCE OF DRUNK DRIVING:  THE ROLE OF SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE REVOCATIONS ¶8 (1984), 
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1984/SS8401.htm (last visited Feb. 
20, 2009) (describing how Report Every Drunk Driver Immediately, 
a reporting program aimed at citizens, is increasingly being 
adopted at the state level). 
17 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 15, at 18  
(listing cases); see also United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 
729–30 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 850 (2002) 
(recognizing split of authority in light of J.L.); People v. 
Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 814 (Cal. 2006) (acknowledging split of 
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 This issue recently gained national attention when the 
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to hear Virginia 
v. Harris.18  This case, coming from the Virginia Supreme Court, 
                                                        
authority); State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714, 720–23 (Haw. 
2004) (discussing authorities on both sides of the question); 
State v. Golotta, 837 A.2d 359, 372 (N.J. 2003) (acknowledging 
split of authority); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 864, 866  
(Vt. 2000) (stating that majority of courts uphold traffic stops 
based on anonymous tips but recognizing dissension of the case 
law). 
18 Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 10 (2009) (mem.).  See, 
e.g., Robert Barnes, Justice Won’t Review Case Involving 
Anonymous Tip About Suspected Drunken Driving, THE WASHINGTON POST, 
Oct. 21, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/20/
AR2009102001600.html (recognizing the denial of certiorari and 
highlighting the dissention amongst the members of the Court in 
regards to what role anonymous tips of drunk driving should play 
in police investigations); cf. Ashby Jones, When Gay Met John:  
An East Side Story, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct. 27, 2009, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/10/27/when-gay-met-john-an-east-si
de-story/ (suggesting that Chief Justice Roberts’s recent gift 
of an unfinished bottle of wine to a journalist who happened to 
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concerned a Driving Under the Influence (DUI) conviction that 
was overturned because the arresting officer stopped the 
defendant’s vehicle solely on the basis of an anonymous tip 
without corroborating any suspicious behavior.19  In an 
impassioned dissent from the denial of certiorari, Chief Justice 
Roberts argued that both the frequency and deadliness of drunk 
driving accidents might justify allowing stops of allegedly 
intoxicated motorists solely on the basis of a bare anonymous 
tip, without requiring corroboration of the tip’s criminal 
allegations.20  He contended that declining to hear Harris was 
effectively giving drunk drivers “one free swerve”21 before 
                                                        
be dining in the same restaurant may have been motivated in part 
by the Chief Justice’s recently expressed attitudes towards 
drunk driving). 
19 Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141, 147 (Va. 2008), cert. 
denied, 130 U.S. 10 (2009) (mem.). 
20 See Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. at 11–12 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (acknowledging the split of authority and 
distinguishing tips in this context, due to the threat posed by 
drunk drivers). 
21 Id. at 12 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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police could initiate a stop, inevitably endangering countless 
lives.22   
 The Chief Justice’s sentiments mirror many of the 
rationalizations relied on by the majority of states and one 
federal circuit that have spoken on this issue, which do not 
require verification of the alleged criminal activity and 
instead allow police to rely on an anonymous tip so long as it 
is sufficiently detailed with innocent information that can 
readily be confirmed.23  Alternatively, the minority of courts 
                                                        
22 Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
23 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 15, at 8 
(summarizing that the majority of courts only require police 
promptly corroborate innocent details of a sufficiently detailed 
anonymous tip, such as a locating a vehicle in the area that 
matching the information provided by the tipster); Denise N. 
Trauth, Comment, Requiring Independent Police Corroboration of 
Anonymous Tips Reporting Drunk Drivers:  How Several States 
Courts are Endangering the Safety of Motorists, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 
323, 323–24 (2007) (“[M]any state courts and the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit have held that officers’ 
corroborations of non-criminal details in anonymous tips 
reporting erratic or drunk driving can sufficiently justify 
investigatory stops of vehicles even if officers have not 
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who have spoken on this issue require officers to personally 
observe a motorist operating in an erratic manner before relying 
on an anonymous tip to conduct an investigatory traffic stop, 
rather than allowing the tip itself to singularly form the basis 
for reasonable suspicion.24 
 Despite the recent denial of certiorari, this issue is ripe 
for review and should be heard to conform this divisive issue to 
the correct interpretation of the law.  In order to establish 
the reasonable suspicion necessary to initiate an investigatory 
                                                        
personally observed criminal activity or traffic violations.”); 
see also United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 734 (8th Cir. 
2001) (rationalizing that police may rely on anonymous tips of 
erratic driving as they are presumptively more reliable since 
they are likely provided by eyewitnesses who are observing 
activity open to the public). 
24 See Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d at 147 (reversing 
conviction for traffic stop based exclusively on an anonymous 
allegation of erratic driving); Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari, supra note 15, at 8 (describing courts that do not 
allow reasonable suspicion to be based entirely on an anonymous 
report of a potential drunk driver); see also id. at 1 
(explaining the split of authority regarding anonymous tips of 
erratic driving to police). 
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traffic stop, police should be required to corroborate beyond 
readily observable innocent details of an anonymous tip alleging 
erratic driving.  Considerable Supreme Court precedent related 
to warrantless seizures implies that police cannot rely solely 
on an anonymous tip alleging drunk driving if the tip provides 
no means to establish the informant’s reliability.25  Moreover, 
the threat posed by a potentially intoxicated motorist is 
inconsistent with the extraordinary danger exception suggested 
in Florida v. J.L.   
 Part I of this Comment will examine the historical 
development of Fourth Amendment case law as it relates to the 
use of anonymous tips by law enforcement.  Part II will address 
how these precedents apply in the context of investigatory 
traffic stops of allegedly intoxicated motorists and will 
examine the reasoning of jurisdictions on either side of the 
issue.  Part III will present an analysis of the issue and argue 
that police must corroborate beyond just innocent information 
provided by an anonymous tip of dangerous driving.  Finally, 
Part IV will conclude by recommending that the appropriate focus 
should be on reducing the anonymity of anonymous reports of 
erratic driving, rather than constructing exceptions for such 
tips under the Fourth Amendment. 
                                                        
25 See infra Part II. 
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I. Background 
 A. Reasonable Suspicion Under Terry v. Ohio 
 The Fourth Amendment is principally concerned with 
protecting citizens from arbitrary and oppressive governmental 
encroachment to persons and property.26  To this end, the Supreme 
Court generally requires government officials first obtain a 
warrant based on probable cause before seizing a citizen or 
searching their person or property.27  Despite this general 
                                                        
26 See JOHN WESLEY HALL JR., SEARCH & SEIZURE 29–30, 100 (Lexis Law 
Publishing 2000) (1979) (describing that the Fourth Amendment is 
intended to protect all citizens from capricious or unjustified 
governmental intrusions); MCWHIRTER, supra note 1, at 140 (“The 
Fourth Amendment was written, in the opinion of most Supreme 
Court justices who have been called upon to interpret it, to 
protect the private life of the people from unreasonable 
intrusions by government officials.”). 
27 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“[The 
Fourth Amendment’s] protection consists in requiring [] 
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead 
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime.”); INGA L. PARSONS, FOURTH 
AMENDMENT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 61 (Anthony Bocchino ed., 2005) 
(discussing the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment). 
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edict, the Supreme Court has, over time, enumerated a number of 
exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements.28  One 
such exception is reasonable suspicion—a reduced standard of 
suspicion that gives police authority to investigate possible 
criminal behavior without obtaining a warrant and on less than 
the probable cause needed to arrest.29  Thus, it is understood 
                                                        
28 See generally PARSONS, supra note 27, at 8–9, 61 (listing 
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment). 
29 See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 
177, 185 (2004) (explaining that reasonable suspicion allows an 
officer to briefly stop a person and investigate the suspicion); 
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123–24 (2000) (describing 
reasonable suspicion as greater than an undeveloped hunch of 
criminal activity, but below probable cause); United States v. 
Roberts, 986 F.2d 1026, 1035 (6th Cir. 1993) (reiterating that 
an investigatory stop requires reasonable suspicion that the 
person to be stopped is involved in criminal activity, a 
standard less than the probable cause needed for arrest); PARSONS, 
supra note 27, at 5 (“Probable cause is a level of suspicion 
necessary to obtain a warrant or effect an arrest . . . .  Where 
less than a full seizure is made, . . . mere reasonable 
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that despite the preference for warrants and probable cause, 
“[t]he Fourth Amendment does not force a police officer who 
lacks ‘probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders 
and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.’”30  
 In the landmark decision Terry v. Ohio,31 the Supreme Court 
first announced and explained the reasonable suspicion 
exception.32  In Terry, the Court considered a situation in which 
a veteran law enforcement officer observed several men acting 
                                                        
suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot can 
warrant the intrusion.”). 
30 Jon A. York, Search and Seizure:  Law Enforcement Officers’ 
Ability to Conduct Investigative Traffic Stops Based Upon an 
Anonymous Tip Alleging Dangerous Driving When the Officers Do 
Not Personally Observe Any Traffic Violations, 34 U MEM. L. REV. 
173, 178 (2003) (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145–46 
(1972)); see also PARSONS, supra note 27, at 19 (noting that prior 
to Terry, all police seizure, regardless how minor, required 
probable cause). 
31 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
32 See id. at 30 (allowing an investigative stop if an officer 
“observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude 
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot . 
. . .”). 
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suspiciously, which subsequently prompted him to confront them 
and pat down their outer clothing for weapons.33  The Court ruled 
these limited involuntary searches were constitutionally 
permissible, and further announced that police may conduct an 
investigatory stop and limited search for weapons where the 
officer reasonably suspects that criminal activity is occurring 
or is about to occur.34 
                                                        
33 Id. at 6–7.  A plainclothes detective watched two men 
deliberately walk in front of a store window approximately 
twelve times and then meet up with a third individual.  Id. at 
6.  Believing the men were preparing to commit a crime and 
fearing they might be armed, the detective approached them, 
identified himself as a police officer, and asked for their 
names.  Id. at 6–7.  Upon receiving only muttered responses, the 
detective turned one of the men around, patted down his outer 
clothes, and discovered a handgun concealed in a pocket.  Id. at 
7.  The detective subsequently frisked the other two men, which 
lead him to find another firearm.  Id. 
34 See id. at 30 (enunciating the stop and frisk doctrine, which 
allows a police officer to investigate his suspicions if he 
reasonably suspects criminal activity may be taking place, and 
to conduct a limited frisk for weapons if in the course of the 
investigation the officer reasonably fears a person may be armed 
 19 
 While Terry involved an investigatory stop on the street, 
similar investigatory stops have subsequently been upheld in the 
vehicle context, so long as the officer reasonably deduces that 
an occupant of the vehicle is engaged in criminal activity.35  
                                                        
and dangerous); see also Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123–24 (clarifying 
that reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than probable 
cause but more than a general, unparticularized hunch); Robyn 
Silvermintz, Note, In the Wake of Florida v. J.L. – When 
Anonymous Tips Give Police Reasonable Suspicion, 19 TOURO L. REV. 
741, 744–46 (2003) (summarizing Terry as carving out an 
exception to the probable cause requirement because it allows an 
officer to make reasonable inquiries and perform a limited 
search of outer clothing based on reasonable conclusions drawn 
from the officer’s observations).  
35 See, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226 (1985) 
(reiterating that police officers may conduct a brief, 
investigatory stop of a moving vehicle when the officer 
reasonably suspects the vehicle’s occupants are engaged in 
criminal activity); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 
(1985) (affirming a vehicle stop based on reasonable suspicion 
of drug trafficking); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 421 
(1981) (validating an investigatory vehicle stop where officers 
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Accordingly, an investigatory traffic stop constitutes a seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment just as the investigatory stop on the 
street was a seizure in Terry.36  As a result, a brief 
investigatory stop of a vehicle similarly requires reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity grounded in definite, objective 
facts.37  If an officer initiates a traffic stop without 
                                                        
reasonably suspected, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, that a vehicle contained illegal aliens). 
36 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996) 
(articulating that an investigatory traffic stop is considered a 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment, even if the stop is limited 
in duration and purpose); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 
(1979) (emphasizing that vehicle stops interfere with citizens’ 
liberty because they hinder freedom of movement, are 
inconvenient, time-consuming and can create anxiety); United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976) (“It is 
agreed that checkpoint stops are ‘seizures’ within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.”); United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 
722, 726 (8th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that vehicle stops 
constitute a search and seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments).   
37 See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228 (requiring, at a minimum, 
reasonable suspicion that someone in the vehicle has been, or 
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reasonable suspicion, or if a stop is founded on an 
unreasonable, subjective belief of criminal activity based on 
otherwise lawful behavior, it will violate the Fourth 
Amendment.38   
                                                        
currently is involved in criminal activity); Harris v. 
Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141, 146 (Va. 2008) (stressing that 
traffic stops require reasonable suspicion based on specific, 
objective facts that an individual is engaged in criminal 
activity); State v. Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516, 521 (Wis. 2001) 
(“At the time of the stop, the officer must be able to point to 
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, objectively warrant a 
reasonable person with the knowledge and experience of the 
officer to believe that criminal activity is afoot.”); cf. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (articulating that an officer’s experience 
entitles him to draw specific inferences from the available 
facts). 
38 See Harris v. Commonwealth, 688 S.E.2d at 147 (“Lawful conduct 
that the officer may subjectively view as unusual is 
insufficient to generate a reasonable suspicion that the 
individual is engaged in criminal activity.”); see also Alabama 
v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328, 330 (1990) (announcing that the 
determination as to whether an officer’s suspicions are 
 22 
 B.  The Use of Third-Party Information in Police 
 Investigations 
 In order to form the reasonable suspicion necessary to 
initiate an investigatory stop or search, officers can rely on 
sources other than their own firsthand observations, such as 
information provided by a third party.39  Indeed, such 
                                                        
reasonable for a Terry stop and frisk is done by examining the 
totality of circumstances, including the “content of information 
possessed by police and its degree of reliability”); cf. Prouse, 
440 U.S. at 663 (invalidating a program in which motorists were 
randomly stopped under the pretext of checking for unlicensed 
drivers).  But cf. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 US. 
444, 455 (1990) (permitting the use of sobriety checkpoints to 
stop motorists without regard to particularized suspicions of 
criminal activity).  Note, however, that the Court had 
previously emphasized that checkpoints are substantially less 
intrusive than a roving patrol stop.  See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U.S. at 558–59.   
39 See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (allowing 
police action on the basis of information from a known informant 
with established credibility). 
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information can even be provided by an anonymous informant.40  
But while police may use an informant’s tip to focus their 
independent investigation, such information cannot be the sole 
basis of suspicion without first demonstrating, via the totality 
of the circumstances, that it comports with the Fourth 
Amendment.41  
 When a known informant provides the information, the tip 
alone will often justify an investigatory stop and search.42  In 
                                                        
40 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 (1983) (utilizing a 
totality of the circumstances test to establish probable cause 
from on an anonymous note that alleged criminal activity because 
it contained detailed information about future actions and 
police were able to independently corroborate most of the note’s 
allegations). 
41 See id. at 238 (offering the test as one in which, “given all 
the circumstances . . . including the ‘veracity and ‘basis of 
knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a 
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place.”). 
42 See PARSONS, supra note 27, at 32 (noting that a tip from 
someone who has previously provided accurate information will 
almost always survive judicial scrutiny). 
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Adams v. Williams,43 the Supreme Court held a police officer was 
sufficiently justified in acting on the basis of a known 
informant’s unverified tip.44  In making this determination, the 
Court stated that the unverified tip had sufficient indicia of 
reliability to justify an investigatory stop because the officer 
received the tip in person from a known informant who had 
established his credibility by providing accurate information in 
the past.45  Conversely, when the source of information provided 
to police is anonymous, something more is required before police 
can initiate a seizure.46 
                                                        
43 407 U.S. 143 (1972). 
44 See id. at 146 (finding a officer’s reliance on a known 
informant’s tip justified where the informant provided the 
information in person and had been known to provided reliable 
information in the past). 
45 See id. at 146–47 (characterizing a known informant’s tip as 
having sufficient indicia of reliability to merit a Terry stop, 
even if it fell short of level required for an arrest or 
warrant).  
46 See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990) (asserting an 
anonymous tip contains no indicia of reliability, and therefore 
requires something beyond the tip’s allegations if it is to be 
used by police); Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 (requiring independent 
 25 
 When information is provided to police anonymously, the tip 
itself may not demonstrate the informant’s veracity or basis of 
knowledge, and therefore cannot be used for a Terry stop or 
search without further police action.47  However, in Illinois v. 
Gates,48 a case in which police anonymously received a message 
with detailed allegations of present and future criminal acts, 
                                                        
police corroboration of allegations contained in an anonymous 
note). 
47 See White, 496 U.S. at 329 (noting that an anonymous tip did 
not contain a foundation with which to establish sufficient 
indicia of reliability); see also HALL JR., supra note 26, at 138 
(addressing generally the difficulty of meeting the dual prongs 
of veracity and basis of knowledge with informant hearsay); 
PARSONS, supra note 27, at 33 (“Anonymous tips are the bottom of 
the food chain when it comes to reliability of information.  
Most troublesome for judges is the fact that the tipster, by not 
identifying himself, is not subjected to any penalties if the 
information turns out to be false.”); 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and 
Seizures § 126 (2009) (noting that information from a reliable 
informant can form the basis of probable cause, while 
information from an informant whose reliability is unknown may 
need to be independently corroborated). 
48 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
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the Court announced that the traditional indicia of reliability, 
veracity and basis of knowledge, should be considered as part of 
the larger totality of the circumstances.49  Therefore, by 
independently corroborating major elements of the note police 
were able to indirectly infer that the anonymous informant 
possessed inside information, permitting them to proceed with a 
search of the areas described in the note despite the author’s 
anonymity.50  
 Similarly, the Court has allowed law enforcement to rely on 
an anonymous tip containing none of the traditional indicia of 
reliability when officers independently corroborate predictive 
information from the tip.51  In Alabama v. White,52 police 
researched an anonymous tip’s allegations of future acts and 
established the accuracy of the predictive information 
sufficient for the officers to reasonably conclude that the 
informant possessed inside information about the subject of the 
                                                        
49 Id. at 225. 
50 Id. at 244–45. 
51 See White, 496 U.S. at 332 (allowing an inference that an 
anonymous informant had a special familiarity with the subject 
of their tip once predictive future information within the tip 
was independently verified by police). 
52 496 U.S. 325 (1990). 
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tip.53  Thus, while the Court labeled the decision a “close 
call,”54 it declared that under the totality of the circumstances 
the corroborated tip provided sufficient reasonable suspicion to 
warrant an investigatory stop.55 
 C.  Florida v. J.L.:  Rejecting the Bare-boned Anonymous 
 Tip as Grounds for Reasonable Suspicion 
 By allowing law enforcement to infer reliability of an 
anonymous tip by independently corroborating its content, the 
Court broadened the spectrum of information that could be used 
to create reasonable suspicion but failed to clarify what type 
of corroboration was permissible.56  However, in Florida v. J.L., 
                                                        
53 See id. at 332 (“[U]nder the totality of the circumstances the 
anonymous tip, as corroborated, exhibited sufficient indicia of 
reliability to justify the investigatory stop . . . .”). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See Silvermintz, supra note 34, at 750–51 (noting that White’s 
failure to provide a standard for what constitutes adequate 
corroboration led lower courts to different interpretations).  
See generally York, supra note 30, at 180–83 (collecting cases 
of lower courts that relied on White to find reasonable 
suspicion based on anonymous tips regarding firearms or erratic 
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the Court established a baseline for police reliance on 
third-party information.57  In an opinion authored by Justice 
Ginsburg, the Court stated that where an anonymous tip is 
                                                        
driving where police only corroborated innocent details of the 
tips). 
57  Terry said “yes” to lowering the probable cause 
standard to reasonable suspicion for police officers 
making an investigatory stop.  Adams said “yes” to the 
‘indicia of reliability’ requirement on a tip made by 
a known informant.  White said “yes” when the police 
sufficiently corroborated an anonymous tip with 
predictive information.  J.L. just said “no” to 
bare-boned anonymous tips. 
See Ernest Bates, Note, Search and Seizure—Anonymous Tips Lack 
Sufficient Reliability to Establish Reasonable Suspicion for 
Investigatory Stop-and-Frisks, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 803, 811 (2001) 
(summarizing the Court’s “endpoint” in police discretion) 
(citations omitted); Melanie D. Wilson, Since When is Dicta 
Enough to Trump Fourth Amendment Rights?  The Aftermath of 
Florida v. J.L., 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 211, 216 (2005) (positing 
that J.L. establishes an “evidentiary floor” for searches and 
seizures allowed under Terry, and as such, provides a bright 
line rule regarding anonymous telephone tips). 
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bare-boned—in that it contains none of the traditional indicia 
of reliability and consists of only readily apparent 
information—police cannot infer the tipster’s reliability by 
only corroborating the innocent, readily apparent details from 
that tip.58 
 In Florida v. J.L., police received an anonymous phone call 
alleging that a “young black male standing at a particular bus 
stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.”59  Officers 
responded to the location and found three black males, one of 
which was wearing a plaid shirt, but neither saw a weapon nor 
witnessed any suspicious behavior.60  Therefore, aside from the 
allegation in the anonymous tip, the officers had no basis to 
conduct an investigatory stop and frisk.61  In spite of this 
                                                        
58 See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000) (recognizing 
that an anonymous tip containing no predictive information gives 
police no means to test the tipster’s basis of knowledge or 
reliability). 
59 Id. at 268. 
60 Id. 
61 See id. (noting the officers had no independent basis to 
believe any of the three black men at the bus stop were involved 
in a criminal act). 
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shortcoming, the officers frisked the men and seized an illegal 
firearm discovered in J.L.’s pocket.62   
 The Supreme Court rejected the subsequent conviction by 
unanimously declaring that an anonymous tip that offers no 
indicia of reliability or other means to assess the informant’s 
credibility is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to 
conduct a stop and frisk.63  Anonymous tips inherently have a low 
degree of reliability and do not offer a straightforward means 
to test either their allegations or their source.64  For that 
reason, the Court noted that in order to assess the tipster’s 
                                                        
62 Id.  J.L. was subsequently charged with possessing a firearm 
while under the age of 18 and for carrying an unlicensed, 
concealed firearm.  Id. at 269. 
63 See id. at 274 (2000) (establishing that an anonymous tip that 
provides no means to assess either the informant’s basis of 
knowledge or veracity cannot be used to initiate an Terry stop 
and frisk, at least where the tip involves an allegation of a 
firearm). 
64 See id. at 270 (quoting White, 496 U.S. 325, 329) (“Unlike a 
tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and 
who can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be 
fabricated, ‘an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the 
informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity.’”). 
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credibility, police must sufficiently corroborate the 
allegations in an anonymous tip.65  However, unlike in White, the 
Court further clarified that corroboration cannot be 
accomplished solely through readily observable innocent 
information, but must instead relate to the alleged criminal 
acts.66  In doing so, the Court distinguished the bare-boned 
anonymous tip in J.L. from the tip in White and stressed that 
the independent corroboration used to infer inside information 
in White only gave that tip a “moderate indicia of 
reliability.”67  Thus, the Court emphasized that “[i]f White was 
                                                        
65 See id. at 271 (stating that anonymous tips require 
corroboration with information from another source). 
66 See id. (stating that readily observable information only 
helps police locate the person the informant means to accuse, 
rather than demonstrate that the informant possesses inside 
information); R. Jason Richards, Using Anonymous Informants to 
Establish Reasonable Suspicion for a Stop, 32 COLO. LAW. 61, 62 
(2003) (observing that while the police in J.L. corroboration 
the description from the anonymous tip, the tip was of limited 
usefulness because it provided no predictive knowledge from 
which to judge the informant’s knowledge or credibility).  
67 See J.L., 529 U.S. at 271 (emphasizing that independent 
corroboration showing an anonymous tipster has some knowledge of 
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a close case on the reliability of anonymous tips, this one 
surely falls on the other side of the line.”68 
 Justice Kennedy, while “join[ing] the opinion in all 
respects,”69 issued a separate concurrence to propose that there 
may be other means to either establish the reliability or narrow 
the anonymity of otherwise anonymous informants.70  Justice 
Kennedy first agreed that where an informant is completely 
anonymous, as was the case in J.L., the tipster is able to “lie 
with impunity”71 because there is no way to assess the 
                                                        
a person’s future actions does not necessarily suggest the 
tipster knows about all of the person’s affairs).  The court 
expressly considered White a “close case” because the only 
indicia of reliability was an inference of inside information; 
an indicia absent in the tip in J.L.  See id.  
68 Id. (distinguishing White’s moderate indicia of reliability 
from the total absence of indicia of reliability in J.L.). 
69 Id. at 274 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
70 See id. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (proposing that tips 
that are anonymous in some aspects may also have elements with 
which to assess the informant’s reliability). 
71 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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informant’s credibility.72  However, he theorized that the 
circumstances surrounding anonymous calls to police often have 
other features that might be used to objectively assess an 
                                                        
72 See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that where a 
court cannot assess an anonymous informant’s credibility, the 
chance that the informant may be lying becomes unacceptable); 
cf. Rex R. Anderegg, Cell Phone Tips of Crime and ‘Reasonable 
Suspicion’, 78 WIS. LAW. 12 (2005) (suggesting that when an 
informant is not completely anonymous, he risks potential 
criminal penalties for making false reports, which should weigh 
in favor of the informant’s reliability).  Along this same line, 
Justice Kennedy indicates that if an informant provides 
information in a way that places his anonymity at risk, such as 
providing the tip in-person, this should be viewed as 
presumptively more reliable.  See J.L., 529 U.S. at 276 
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Wilson, supra note 57, at 218 
(summarizing that lower courts generally hold in-person 
anonymous tips as more reliable than anonymous tips over the 
telephone); see also id. at 221–22 (arguing in-person tips allow 
for establishing credibility, demeanor, knowledge basis, and 
identity of the tipster). 
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informant’s reliability.73  Justice Kennedy’s concurrence implies 
that if the desired end is to be able to rely on anonymous tips, 
the proper focus might be on reducing the anonymity of those 
tips rather than attempting to dilute the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
 Following the majority opinion’s explanation that 
corroboration of innocent information from a bare-boned 
anonymous tip is insufficient to justify police action, the 
Court also declined to recognize that firearms posed such an 
                                                        
73 See J.L., 529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(suggesting police can overcome a bare-boned anonymous tip by 
establishing its reliability or identifying the tipster through 
other means, such as instant caller identification, voice 
recording, routine documentation of calls, or judging the 
accuracy of consecutive anonymous calls from the same source); 
see also Amanda Lisenby, Note, Informant Reliability Under the 
Fourth Amendment in Florida v. J.L., 28 N. KY. L. REV. 172, 183 
(2000) (arguing police should be required to make reasonable 
attempts to establish a caller’s identity and suggesting that 
the cost that there may be fewer informants due to a fear of 
identification would be substantially outweighed by a greater 
guarantee that officers will conduct reasonable searches based 
on informants’ tips). 
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inherent danger as to justify an automatic exception to the 
reliability analysis.74  Specifically, the Court reasoned that to 
allow reasonable suspicion to be automatically established 
whenever an anonymous tip alleged the presence of a firearm 
would invite abuse by those looking to subject other persons to 
the invasive process of a police seizure and search.75  
Additionally, the Court expressed concern that such an exception 
for firearms would inevitably be used to justify exceptions in 
other closely related areas—such as tips about illegal drug 
                                                        
74 See J.L., 529 U.S. at 272 (rejecting a firearms exception to 
the reasonable suspicion requirement for an investigatory stop 
because it could too easily be abused and would be too difficult 
to confine to just firearms). 
75 See id. (asserting that a firearms exception would enable 
anyone to subject another to a mandatory police detention and 
search simply by anonymously alleging that person had an illegal 
firearm); see also United States v. Walker, 7 F.3d 26, 31 (2d. 
Cir. 1993) (Kearse, J., dissenting) (voicing concern that an 
anonymous call to police containing a physical description and 
criminal allegation, but little predictive information, may 
actually have been placed in order to harass its subject, a 
morbidly obese man). 
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activity—which would unreasonably erode the foundations of the 
Fourth Amendment.76   
 While choosing not to recognize a firearms exception, the 
Justices nevertheless explicitly did not foreclose the idea that 
particular circumstances might exist where an otherwise 
insufficient anonymous tip could justify an investigatory stop.77  
To illustrate this possibility, the Court stated, “[w]e do not 
say, for example, that a report of a person carrying a bomb need 
bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a 
person carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally 
conduct a frisk.”78  Thus, while the Court hinted that an 
anonymous tip could potentially allege such an extreme danger as 
                                                        
76 See J.L., 529 U.S. at 273 (disallowing a firearms exception 
and stating that “the Fourth Amendment is not so easily 
satisfied”); Anderegg, supra note 72, at 14 (quoting J.L., 529 
U.S. at 273) (“The Supreme Court flatly rejected the request [of 
a firearms exception] on the ground that creating such an 
exception would lead to a slippery slope of additional 
exceptions, ‘thus allowing the exception[s] to swallow the 
rule.’”). 
77 See J.L., 529 U.S. at 273 (identifying, in dicta, that an 
extreme danger exception might exist for anonymous tips). 
78 Id. at 273–74. 
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to forgo the usual reliability requirement, the Justices 
specifically chose not to elaborate since the facts of the case 
were not applicable to such an exception.79  Consequently, a 
number of lower courts have relied on this bald proposition to 
distinguish bare-boned anonymous tips about drunk driving in 
order to bypass J.L.’s holding and be used to justify 
investigatory traffic stop where police corroborate innocent, 
readily identifiable details of the tip.80 
                                                        
79 See id. at 273 (noting that an extreme danger exception might 
exist, but choosing not to speculate on the exception within the 
confines of the case).  “We do not say, for example, that a 
report of a person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of 
reliability we demand for a report of a person carrying a 
firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.”  
See id. at 273–74. 
80 E.g., United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 
2001) (upholding a traffic stop based on an anonymous allegation 
of dangerous driving, even though the detaining officer did not 
witness any erratic or unusual behavior); see Brief of Mothers 
Against Drunk Driving as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner 
at 13, Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10 (2009) (No. 08-1385) 
(arguing that in the majority of cases, “all that is required is 
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II. Judicial Differences of Opinion About Anonymous Tips of 
Possible Intoxicated Motorists 
 There is a clear division of opinion in jurisdictions that 
have considered what role anonymous tips alleging potentially 
intoxicated motorist should play in police investigations.81  
Several state courts and one federal circuit court have held 
that an anonymous call to police about an erratic driver is 
sufficiently distinct from the anonymous report of a concealed 
firearm in J.L. to justify police action.82  In general, these 
                                                        
a temporally proximate corroboration that a defendant’s car 
matches the one described in the anonymous tip.”). 
81 Compare Wheat, 278 F.3d at 737 (permitting investigatory stop 
based on an anonymous tip where officer verified easily 
observable innocent details), with Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 
S.E.2d 141, 147 (Va. 2008) (rejecting an investigatory traffic 
stop based on an anonymous tip where officer did not witness 
reasonably suspicious driving). 
82 See, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 737 (upholding stop based on 
anonymous tip of erratic driving where officer corroborated most 
innocent details of the tip); Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 
1212, 1221 (Del. 2004) (upholding stop based on anonymous call 
about erratic driving that provided the make, model, color, 
license plate number and travel route of vehicle, as well as 
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courts differentiate anonymous tips about dangerous driving in 
three aspects, thereby justifying their use as the sole basis 
for an investigatory stop.83  Conversely, other courts that have 
                                                        
race of the driver, where the officer corroborated only innocent 
details); State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714, 724 (Haw. 2004) 
(allowing stop based on anonymous tip of dangerous driving that 
listed the vehicle’s make, model, and license plate number, 
despite that the officer did not witness any erratic driving); 
State v. Crawford, 67 P.3d 115, 120 (Kan. 2003) (upholding stop 
based on anonymous call that a Dodge pickup truck with Oklahoma 
plates on a specific road was driving recklessly); State v. 
Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 629 (Iowa 2001) (affirming stop by 
distinguishing anonymous tips about erratic driving from other 
contexts and noting the threat posed by intoxicated motorists); 
State v. Contreras, 79 P.3d 1111, 1117 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003) 
(permitting a stop based on an anonymous tip due to the amount 
of danger posed by a possibly drunk driver and because the 
caller was believed to have contemporaneously observed the 
erratic driving).  See generally Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari, supra note 15, at 18 (listing cases). 
83 See, e.g., Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 11–12 (2009) 
(mem.) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that courts that have 
upheld such investigative traffic stops distinguish J.L. by 
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considered the issue reason that a bare-boned anonymous tip 
about erratic driving lacks sufficient reliability to be 
treated, without corroboration of the criminal allegations, as 
anything more than an investigatory tool.84  Moreover, these 
                                                        
arguing that intoxicated drivers pose a greater imminent danger; 
anonymous tips are likely from eyewitnesses observing a criminal 
act in public, which instills higher reliability; and traffic 
stops are less invasive and involve a lesser expectation of 
privacy than similar in-person stops); see also Trauth, supra 
note 23, at 340–42 (proffering that anonymous tips of erratic 
driving can be distinguished from those relating to guns because 
erratic driving is not a concealed crime and can be publically 
observed; the mobile nature of cars suggests the abuse 
considered in J.L. is less likely; erratic driving poses a 
imminent threat to public safety; and the level of intrusion in 
a traffic stop is temporary, brief, and public).   
84 See Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d at 147 (invalidating 
traffic stop based on an anonymous tip with no corroboration of 
alleged dangerous driving); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 
1077 (Wyo. 1999) (holding traffic stop illegal where officer did 
not personally observe the alleged erratic driving); State v. 
Lee, 938 P.2d 637, 638–40 (Mont. 1997) (stating that anonymous 
caller did not indicate whether his allegations were based on 
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personal observation); State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638, 640–45 
(N.D. 1994) (rejecting stop based on bare-boned anonymous tip 
that was uncorroborated by police); Washington v. State, 740 
N.E.2d 1241, 1243–46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that traffic 
stop was not justified where officer did not witness erratic 
driving or corroborate predictions of future behavior from an 
anonymous caller); State v. Boyle, 793 So. 2d 1281, 1284–85 (La. 
Ct. App. 2001) (finding stop based on anonymous tip 
unconstitutional because officers did not witness any erratic 
driving); Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d 288, 291 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (stating corroboration of only readily 
observable details is insufficient to establish reasonable 
suspicion); see also Wheat, 278 F.3d at 734 (proposing that 
predictive aspects of an anonymous tip may be less applicable 
where the tip “describes contemporaneous, readily observable 
criminal actions, as in the case of erratic driving witnessed by 
another motorist”).  The court further argues that since most 
erratic driving tips are provided by eyewitnesses, there is no 
need to demonstrate the anonymous caller possesses inside 
information.  Id. 
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jurisdictions have found that the threat posed by drunk driving 
does not warrant an exception to the ordinary reliability 
requirement.85 
 A. Majority Approach:  Courts That Require Corroboration 
 of Only Readily Apparent Details from an Anonymous Tip of 
 Erratic Driving 
 First, courts upholding traffic stops based solely on an 
anonymous call about erratic driving reason that such a tip is 
presumptively more reliable than a similar call about a firearm 
due to the likelihood that the tipster is contemporaneously 
observing a public activity.86  As emphasized by the Supreme 
                                                        
85  See, e.g., Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d at 147 
(rejecting traffic stop based entirely on an anonymous tip, 
despite the motorist being subsequently found to be legally 
intoxicated, because the detaining officer did not corroborate 
the alleged erratic driving). 
86 See, e.g., State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 627–28 (Iowa 
2001) (distinguishing anonymous allegations of concealed 
criminal activity from criminal activity conducted in public, 
and further reasoning that the caller demonstrated his basis of 
knowledge by witnessing the publically-committed act); see also 
Wheat, 278 F.3d at 734 (proposing that predictive aspects of an 
anonymous tip may be less applicable where the tip “describes 
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Court of Vermont, “[w]hat is described in these drunk or 
dangerous driving reports is a crime in progress, carried out in 
public, identifiable and observable by anyone in sight of its 
commission.”87  Therefore, rather than requiring corroboration of 
predictive facts to establish reliability, these courts hold 
that an informant is presumptively reliable so long as they 
allege to contemporaneously witness the erratic driving.88  These 
                                                        
contemporaneous, readily observable criminal actions, as in the 
case of erratic driving witnessed by another motorist”).  The 
court further argues that since most erratic driving tips are 
provided by eyewitnesses, there is no need to demonstrate the 
anonymous caller possesses inside information.  See id. 
87 State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 875 (Vt. 2000) (Skoglund, J., 
concurring). 
88 See Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212, 1220–21 (Del. 2004) 
(assuming tips alleging erratic driving are more reliable 
because providing a detailed description of a passing car would 
be difficult unless the tipster was concurrently observing the 
vehicle); State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714, 723 (Haw. 2004) 
(announcing that unlike the basis of knowledge of the informant 
in J.L., the basis of knowledge of the anonymous tipster who 
informed police about an erratic driver is clear); State v. 
Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 627–28 (Iowa 2001) (concluding that 
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courts generally allow an anonymous tip to justify an 
investigatory stop when the caller describes a vehicle in 
sufficient detail and the responding officer locates a vehicle 
matching that description within a short timeframe.89 
                                                        
anonymous tips reporting concealed criminal activity are 
sufficiently different from tips alleging criminal activity 
conducted in public and noting the tipster’s basis of knowledge 
was established by purporting to be an eyewitness); York, supra 
note 30, at 189–90 (articulating that these courts generally do 
not require verifying a tipster’s inside knowledge for crimes 
open to the public, and instead rely on contemporaneous accounts 
to establish an informant’s reliability). 
89 See, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 731–32 (utilizing three factors 
to determine validity of a traffic stop based on an anonymous 
tip of erratic driving:  (1) quantity of information provided 
about the vehicle, (2) span of time between receiving the tip 
and locating the vehicle, and (3) a suggestion that the 
informant personally observed the erratic driving); 
Bloomingdale, 842 A.2d at 1221 (articulating that an anonymous 
tip of erratic driving is presumptively more reliable where the 
tipster provides a detailed description of the vehicle and an 
“officer[] corroborat[es] the descriptive features of the 
vehicle and the location of its travel in close temporal 
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 Second, these courts hold that the threat posed by a 
potentially drunk driver is substantially greater and more 
exigent than the dangers associated with an anonymous tip about 
a firearm, thereby justifying police action under the 
extraordinary danger exception suggested in J.L.90  These 
                                                        
proximity to when the report was made”); State v. Sousa, 855 
A.2d 1284, 1290 (N.H. 2004) (announcing that whether an 
anonymous tip creates reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop 
depends on whether the tipster purports to be an eyewitness, the 
level of detail of the tip, and the amount of time between 
receipt of the tip and location of a matching vehicle); York, 
supra note 30, at 187–88 (detailing various courts’ information 
and time requirements). 
90 E.g., United States v. Elston, 479 F.3d 314, 315–19 (4th Cir. 
2007) (upholding stop based on a detailed anonymous tip alleging 
an imminent threat to public safety); People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 
810, 813 (Cal. 2006) (asserting the risk posed by a potentially 
intoxicated driver established reasonable suspicion); Boyea, 765 
A.2d at 867 (reasoning an “anonymous report of an erratic or 
drunk driver on the highway presents a qualitatively different 
level of danger, and concomitantly greater urgency for prompt 
action”); see also York, supra note 30, at 193–95 
(distinguishing between anonymous tips regarding driving and 
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jurisdictions reiterate the sentiments of the Supreme Court of 
Vermont, which differentiated an anonymous call about erratic 
driving from one involving a firearm and likened the threat 
posed by a drunk driver as akin to a ticking time bomb:  
In contrast to the report of an individual in 
possession of a gun, an anonymous report of an erratic 
or drunk driver on the highway presents a 
qualitatively different level of danger, and 
concomitantly greater urgency for prompt action.  In 
the case of a concealed gun, the possession itself 
might be legal, and the police could, in any event, 
surreptitiously observe the individual for a 
reasonable period of time without running the risk of 
death or injury with every passing moment.  An officer 
in pursuit of a reportedly drunk driver on a freeway 
does not enjoy such a luxury.  Indeed, a drunk driver 
                                                        
firearms by noting that erratic driving is a publically 
observable crime that does not require familiarity with the 
subject and poses a substantial imminent danger); cf. 
Commonwealth v. Hurd, 557 N.E.2d 72, 72–73 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) 
(allowing anonymous tip where allegedly erratic driver was said 
to have three children in the car, which presented an emergency 
situation). 
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is not at all unlike a “bomb,” and a mobile one at 
that.91 
Furthermore, proponents of this position stress that an 
anonymous tip about a motorist—unlike one involving a firearm—
cannot lead to a consensual encounter.92  These courts reason 
                                                        
91 Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867 (Vt. 2000). 
92 See Wheat, 278 F.3d at 736 (suggesting that a consensual 
encounter is an option in an allegation regarding a firearm, but 
not where the allegation involves reckless driving); cf. York, 
supra note 30, at 195 (highlighting that even if the danger 
presented by an intoxicated motorist is no greater than that 
posed by a firearm, police have comparatively fewer 
investigation alternatives for suspected drunk drivers).  See 
generally Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.429, 434–35 (1991) 
(explaining that police may engage and make requests of 
individuals without have any basis for suspicion, where the 
individual consents to the encounter).  Proponents of this 
position note that when police cannot initiate a consensual 
encounter and are required police to wait until they personally 
observe erratic behavior, it leads to one of three possible 
scenarios:  “the suspect drives without incident for several 
miles; the suspect drifts harmlessly onto the shoulder, 
providing corroboration of the tip and probable cause for an 
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that because police do not have this investigatory option, 
requiring officers to wait to intervene until after they 
personally observe erratic behavior creates an unreasonably 
dangerous situation, since the longer the accused vehicle is 
mobile the greater the probability that it will cause an 
accident.93  
                                                        
arrest; or the suspect veers into oncoming traffic, or fails to 
stop at a light, or otherwise causes a sudden and potentially 
devastating accident.”  Wheat, 278 F.3d at 736–37. 
93  See State v. Crawford, 67 P.3d 115, 118 (Kan. 2003) (“A motor 
vehicle in the hands of a drunken driver is an instrument of 
death. It is deadly, it threatens the safety of the public, and 
that threat must be eliminated as quickly as possible.”) 
(citations omitted); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra 
note 15, at 24 (arguing the “calculus is different” for 
anonymous tips alleging drunk driver, in that the longer officer 
waits before intercepting an allegedly intoxicated motorist, the 
greater the likelihood of danger).  Alternately, some suggest 
that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement could plausibly be extended to include the danger 
posed by an allegation of a possibly drunk motorist.  See Bryk, 
supra note 3, at 296–97. 
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 Finally, a number of courts excuse anonymous tips that 
allege erratic driving under the rationale that a vehicle search 
has a lower expectation of privacy and is inherently less 
intrusive than a similar seizure and search of a person on the 
street.94  The Supreme Court of Vermont exemplified this 
reasoning in State v. Boyea95 by upholding a DUI conviction in 
part by explaining that unlike an in-person stop and frisk, an 
investigatory traffic stop is “a temporary and brief detention 
                                                        
94 See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) 
(acknowledging the reduced reasonable expectation of privacy in 
an automobile); Wheat, 278 F.3d at 737 (noting investigatory 
traffic stops are less invasive than an investigatory stop and 
frisk conducted in person on a public street); Trauth, supra 
note 23, at 331 (quoting Boyea, 765 A.2d at 868) (characterizing 
the liberty interest involved in a traffic stop as weaker than 
the “hands-on violation of the person” in J.L.). 
95 765 A.2d 862, 868 (Vt. 2000).  In Boyea, an officer received 
an anonymous report that a blue/purple Volkswagen Jetta with New 
York license plates was being driven erratically on a certain 
section of Interstate 89.  Id. at 863.  Within five minutes, the 
officer found a vehicle matching the description and initiated a 
traffic stop based on the tip, which subsequently led to Boyea’s 
arrest for DUI.  Id. 
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that is exposed to public view,”96 which creates less 
interference with a citizen’s liberty interest.97   
 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which is the 
only federal court to decide on this issue, relied on all three 
of these justifications in United States v. Wheat98 to uphold a 
stop based on an anonymous tip without police corroboration.99  
An anonymous caller notified police that a tan or cream-colored 
Nissan Stanza bearing a license plate containing the letters 
W-O-C was passing on the wrong side of the road, cutting off 
                                                        
96 Id. at 868 (citation omitted).  
97 See id. (validating a traffic stop based on an anonymous tip 
by asserting that the liberty interest at stake is qualitatively 
lower than in a hands-on search and seizure); see also Wheat, 
278 F.3d at 734 (announcing that an investigatory traffic stop 
is “considerably less invasive, both physically and 
psychologically, than the frisk on a public corner that was at 
issue in J.L.”); Trauth, supra note 23, at 342 (characterizing 
traffic stops as having a lower level of intrusion because they 
are temporary and exposed to the public). 
98 278 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2001). 
99 See id. at 737 (determining a traffic stop based on a call 
from an anonymous motorist was reasonable under the totality of 
the circumstances). 
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other motorists, and “otherwise being driven as if by a 
‘complete maniac.’”100  Shortly thereafter, a patrolling officer 
saw a vehicle that matched the caller’s physical description and 
immediately stopped the motorist without observing any irregular 
or dangerous behavior, which lead to the subsequent arrest of 
both the vehicle’s driver and passenger for possession of a 
controlled substance.101  In upholding the stop, the court first 
dismissed the need for predictive information in an anonymous 
tip where the informant is describing a contemporaneous, readily 
observable crime.102  The court then justified the stop by noting 
that since a traffic stop involves a lesser invasion than a 
traditional stop and frisk, a motorist’s right to be free of 
unreasonable government incursion is outweighed by the imminent 
                                                        
100 Id. at 724. 
101 Id. at 724–25.  While the anonymous caller reported a Nissan 
Stanza, Wheat’s vehicle was a tan Nissan Maxima with a license 
plate beginning with the letters W-O-C.  Id. at 724. 
102 See id. at 735 (“We think that an anonymous tip conveying a 
contemporaneous observation of criminal activity whose innocent 
details are corroborated is at least as credible as the one in 
White, where future criminal activity was predicted, but only 
innocent details were corroborated.”). 
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threat posed by drunk drivers and the limited investigative 
options available to police.103 
 B. Minority Approach:  Courts That Require Independent 
 Corroboration of Non-Innocent Details from an Anonymous Tip 
 of Erratic Driving 
 While the majority of courts that have addressed the issue 
allow investigatory traffic stops where an officer corroborates 
readily observable details of an anonymous tip about an erratic 
driver, other courts hold that that an anonymous tip, by itself, 
does not have sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a 
stop.104  Largely, these jurisdictions rely closely on the 
                                                        
103 See id. at 736–37 (arguing that traffic stop based on an 
anonymous allegation of an intoxicated driver is substantially 
different from a Terry stop and frisk where the anonymous tip is 
about a firearm). 
104 See Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141, 147 (Va. 2008) 
(vacating conviction where traffic stop was based only on an 
anonymous tip with no corroboration of criminality); McChesney 
v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Wyo. 1999) (holding no reasonable 
suspicion where officer did not personally witness alleged 
erratic driving); State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638, 640–45 (N.D. 
1994) (holding the anonymous tip was “short on reliability, . . 
. short on specifics,” and uncorroborated by police 
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Supreme Court’s reasoning in J.L., and similarly do not view the 
danger presented by a potentially intoxicated motorist as 
justifying an exception to the reliability requirement.105 
                                                        
observation); Washington v. State, 740 N.E.2d 1241, 1243–46 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding stop based on anonymous tip 
invalid where officer tailed vehicle for two miles without 
witnessing erratic driving, nor corroborated predictions of 
future behavior); State v. Boyle, 793 So. 2d 1281, 1284–85 (La. 
Ct. App. 2001) (reversing conviction that resulted from 
anonymous tip where officers did not observe any unusual driving 
and stop took place on suspect’s private property); Commonwealth 
v. Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d 288, 291 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) 
(finding officer’s corroboration of only readily observable 
details insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for a 
Terry stop). 
105 See Brief of Mothers Against Drunk Driving as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Petitioner, supra note 80, at 14 (“In such states, 
anonymous tips serve only to help the police to locate a 
possible drunk driver; to intervene, however, the officer must 
wait until he or she observes the driver engage in imminently 
dangerous driving.”); York, supra note 30, at 185–86 
(postulating that while the courts’ specific reasons for 
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Accordingly, “[i]n such states, anonymous tips serve only to 
help the police to locate a possible drunk driver; to intervene, 
however, the officer must wait until he or she observes the 
driver engage in imminently dangerous driving.”106  Moreover, 
some of these courts reiterate the fear expressed in J.L. that 
allowing an erratic driving exception would invite potential 
abuse by those seeking to harass innocent persons.107   
                                                        
invalidating stops based solely on anonymous tips have varied, 
their essential justification has been consistent). 
106 Brief of Mothers Against Drunk Driving as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 80, at 14 (explaining the 
minority view of the role played by anonymous tips). 
107 See McChesney, 988 P.2d at 1077 (recognizing potential for 
abuse in allowing a reliability exception for anonymous tips of 
drunk driving); Wilson, supra note 57, at 229–30 (acknowledging 
abuse potential created by an exception to the reliability 
analysis).  In fact, even courts that allow reliance on such 
tips expressly acknowledge this risk.  See Wheat, 278 F.3d at 
735 (admitting anonymous tips of erratic driving may be 
completely fabricated as a means to harass other motorists, but 
arguing that the risk of falsified tips is insufficient to 
prevent all investigatory traffic stops based on anonymous 
tips).  But see Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212, 1220 (Del. 
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 McChesney v. State,108 a case from the Supreme Court of 
Wyoming, is indicative of the approach taken by these 
jurisdictions.109  A police dispatcher broadcast an anonymously 
received tip which alleged that a red Mercury with temporary 
license plates was being driven erratically, but gave no 
indication that the tipster had inside knowledge regarding the 
Mercury’s driver.110  An officer proceeded to follow a vehicle 
matching the description and subsequently initiated a traffic 
stop without actually witnessing any erratic or illegal 
driving.111  On review, the court held the seizure invalid and 
reversed the ensuing drug conviction because the anonymous 
caller provided no predictive information and the officer failed 
to independently corroborate the alleged criminal act, since he 
                                                        
2004) (arguing that anonymous tips of erratic driving are 
unlikely because it requires knowledge of the vehicle, its 
location, and its direction of travel, and needs police to be 
readily able to stop the vehicle). 
108 988 P.2d 1071 (Wyo. 1999). 
109 See, e.g., supra note 104 (listing cases not permitting 
traffic stops solely on bare-boned anonymous tips of possibly 
intoxicated drivers). 
110 See McChesney, 988 P.2d at 1073. 
111 See id. 
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did not personally witness any erratic behavior before stopping 
the vehicle and instead relied solely on the anonymous 
bare-boned tip, whose reliability was unknown.112 
 Similarly, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts invalidated a 
traffic stop where the detaining officer did not corroborate the 
erratic driving alleged in an anonymous tip.113  An anonymous 
motorist called police to report that a particular pickup truck 
was travelling on the wrong side of the highway, and then called 
back to report the vehicle had crossed the median back to the 
proper traffic lanes.114  Police, relying exclusively on the 
information from the tip, stopped a truck matching the 
                                                        
112 See id. at 1077–78 (holding police lacked reasonable 
suspicion to conduct an investigatory traffic stop because the 
anonymous tip itself was not sufficiently reliable and the 
officer failed to independently corroborate the anonymously 
alleged criminal activity by observing suspicious behavior 
necessary to form the reasonable suspicion required to initiate 
the stop). 
113 See Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d 288, 291 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2000) (announcing corroboration of only obvious details 
provided by an anonymous tip does not establish reasonable 
suspicion to initiate a traffic stop). 
114 Id. at 290. 
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description and subsequently charged the motorist with an 
alcohol-related offense.115  In reversing the convictions, the 
court emphasized that reasonable suspicion cannot be based 
solely on corroboration of readily apparent details from a 
bare-boned anonymous tip.116 
 C. Adoption of the Minority Approach in Virginia v. 
 Harris and the Subsequent Denial of Certiorari  
 Consistent with the viewpoint expressed by the minority of 
states that have heard this issue, the Supreme Court of Virginia 
overturned a DUI conviction where the initial vehicle stop was 
based entirely on a bare-boned anonymous tip of erratic 
driving.117  On December 31, 2005, a police dispatcher informed 
Officer Picard of an anonymous call reporting that an 
intoxicated driver named Joseph Harris was travelling south in 
                                                        
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 291 (explaining that while the officer did corroborate 
some details, the corroboration included no facts “which were 
not otherwise easily obtainable by an uninformed bystander”). 
117 See Harris v. Commonwealth, 688 S.E.2d 141, 146 (Va. 2008) 
(asserting that an anonymous tip lacking in information with 
which to establish the informant’s basis of knowledge or 
credibility cannot solely form the basis of reasonable suspicion 
for a Terry stop). 
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the 3400 block of Meadowbridge Road in a green Nissan Altima 
bearing a partial license plate number of Y8066.118  While 
Officer Picard was provided with considerable detail about the 
motorist, he was not given any details about the anonymous 
caller nor the timeframe in which the tipster observed the 
motorist.119  After responding to the location, Office Picard 
proceeded to follow a green Nissan Altima with license plate 
number YAR–8046 headed southbound.120  The officer followed 
Harris’s vehicle some distance—during which time the vehicle did 
not speed or swerve—until Harris stopped on his own accord, at 
which point Officer Picard initiated a traffic stop.121  During 
                                                        
118 Id. at 144. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id.  While Harris did not speed or swerve, Harris’s brake 
lights did flash three times before the Nissan Altima pulled 
over on the side of the road.  Id. (stating that Harris 
activated the vehicle’s brake lights three times:  (1) at an 
intersection despite having right of way, (2) 50 feet prior to 
stopping at a red light, (3) and finally while completely 
stopped at the red light). 
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the stop Harris exhibited signs of intoxication and failed a 
field sobriety test and was subsequently convicted of DUI.122 
 The Supreme Court of Virginia held that Harris’s Fourth 
Amendment rights had been violated and consequently reversed the 
conviction.123  While Harris argued the traffic stop was invalid 
because it had been based on an uncorroborated anonymous tip, 
Virginia asserted that the anonymous tip, combined with Picard’s 
observations at the traffic stop, created reasonable suspicion 
to justify the stop.124  The court concluded that the seizure was 
unwarranted because the anonymous tip lacked sufficient indicia 
of reliability and Officer Picard had not independently 
witnessed any reasonably suspicious conduct prior to initiating 
the stop.125  Furthermore, the court expressed concern that by 
                                                        
122 See id. (noting that Harris stumbled as he exited his vehicle 
and had watery eyes, slurred speech, and a strong odor of 
alcohol on his breath). 
123 Id. at 147 (holding that the officer’s observations and the 
anonymous tip did not create a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity sufficient to initiate a traffic stop). 
124 Id. at 145. 
125 See id. at 146 (voicing that an anonymous tip that cannot 
establish the tipster’s basis of knowledge or credibility 
“cannot, of itself, establish the requisite quantum of suspicion 
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providing the tip anonymously, the caller could lie to the 
police without consequence since the tipster’s anonymity made 
him immune to the penalties for providing false information.126  
 Justice Kinser dissented from the ruling and in doing so 
echoed many of the sentiments expressed by those jurisdictions 
allowing stops bases solely on an anonymous tip.127  The 
                                                        
for an investigative stop”); see also id. (explaining that 
predictive information in an anonymous tip is unnecessary if 
police can corroborate the tip with observable criminal actions, 
which was not done in this instance).  The court explained 
further that while Harris’s pumping of his vehicle’s brakes was 
unusual, it did not objectively indicate an intoxicated driver.  
See id. at 146–47 (emphasizing that law enforcement must view 
behavior that objectively indicates intoxication in order to 
initiate a traffic stop based on personal observation). 
126 See id. at 146 (echoing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in J.L. 
by noting that an unknown informant who does not provide 
information in person may be impervious to penalty from 
perjury); see also VA. CODE ANN. §18.2-461 (West 2010) (explaining 
the penalty for providing false information to police). 
127 Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d at 148 (Kinser, J., 
dissenting).  Two other justices joined Justice Kinser’s 
dissent, leading to a 4–3 decision.  Id. 
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dissenting Justice stressed the danger presented by erratic 
drivers required a concomitantly greater need for quick 
action.128  Moreover, she argued that the tip’s prediction of a 
direction of travel and the officer’s corroboration of innocent 
details weighed in favor of the tip’s reliability and inferred 
the veracity of the non-corroborated criminal allegations.129 
 Following the Virginia Supreme Court’s reversal, the 
Commonwealth unsuccessfully petitioned the United States Supreme 
Court for certiorari.130  In an impassioned dissent from the 
denial of certiorari, Chief Justice Roberts urged the Court to 
take up the issue in light of the split of authority.131  He 
highlighted the frequency of alcohol-related traffic deaths and 
then argued that by allowing the Virginia ruling to stand, the 
Court was effectively allowing drunk drivers “one free 
                                                        
128 See id. at 149 (Kinser, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority for ignoring the danger presented by drunk drivers). 
129 See id. at 148 (Kinser, J., dissenting) (suggesting an 
anonymous tip’s alleged criminal acts can be presumed where its 
innocent details are verified). 
130 Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 10 (2009) (mem.). 
131 See id. at 11 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (recognizing the 
split of authority on what level of corroboration is needed to 
initiate a traffic stop alleging an intoxicated motorist). 
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swerve,”132 thus creating the potential for needless tragedy.133  
Moreover, he argued that the imminence of danger posed by 
potential drunk drivers might justify forgoing a requirement 
that an officer observe suspicious behavior before initiating a 
stop.134  And while he acknowledged the Court’s holding in J.L. 
about bare-boned anonymous tips, he reasoned that those 
limitations might not apply to anonymous tips about erratic 
driving.135  In sum, the Chief Justice suggested that given the 
                                                        
132 Id. at 12 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
133 See id. at 10 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The decision 
below commands that police officers following a driver reported 
to be drunk do nothing until they see the driver actually do 
something unsafe on the road—by which time it may be too 
late.”). 
134 See id. at 11 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (weighing the 
imminence of danger posed by intoxicated motorists to the 
imminence of danger posed in other circumstances). 
135 See id. at 10 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing anonymous 
tips about erratic driving may not require corroboration and 
suggesting a lesser expectation of privacy in vehicles might 
exempt such tips from the reliability analysis); cf. id. at 11 
n.1 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (listing instances in which the 
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danger at stake, law enforcement might be justified in acting 
solely on the basis of an anonymous tip that alleges a drunk or 
dangerous driver.136 
III.  Analysis 
 While the use of alcohol on our nation’s roadways is a 
serious concern,137 the solution to that problem should not come 
                                                        
Court affirmed anti-drunk-driving policies that might be 
considered unconstitutional under other circumstances). 
136 See id. at 12 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (commenting that 
“[t]he conflict is clear and the stakes are high” and charging 
that law enforcement should be able to use “every legitimate 
tool at their disposal for getting drunk drivers off the road”). 
137 See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 13 (2004) (“Drunk driving 
is a nationwide problem, as evidenced by the efforts of 
legislatures to prohibit such conduct and impose appropriate 
penalties.”); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558–59 
(1983) (acknowledging that “[Drunk driving] occurs with tragic 
frequency on our Nation’s highways” and highlighting the Court’s 
previous recognition of the issue); see also NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC 
SAFETY ADMIN., 2007 TRAFFIC SAFETY ANNUAL ASSESSMENT—ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED DRIVING 
FATALITIES 2 (2008), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811016.PDF 
(finding that at least 12,500 alcohol-impaired driving 
fatalities have occurred annually since 1998). 
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at the price of further encroaching on citizens’ Fourth 
Amendment freedoms.  Jurisdictions that allow police to rely 
solely on an anonymous tip of erratic driving for a traffic stop 
incorrectly base their reasoning more on emotional appeals and 
inaccurate generalizations than on a logical analysis of the 
circumstances surrounding investigatory traffic stops.138  
However, law enforcement cannot, in accordance with legal 
principles and factual circumstances, base an investigatory 
traffic stop exclusively on a bare-boned anonymous tip about 
drunk driving because such a tip neither fulfills the 
reliability analysis discussed in J.L.139 nor merits an exception 
to the reasonable suspicion requirement.  As a result, where the 
information contained in an anonymous tip provides no means to 
test the informant’s credibility, police must corroborate the 
criminal allegations from the tip, rather than just those 
                                                        
138 See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 67 P.3d 115, 118 (Kan. 2003) 
(“A motor vehicle in the hands of a drunken driver is an 
instrument of death.”); State v. Contreras, 79 P.3d 1111, 1116 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2003) (emphasizing the State’s serious concern 
over the potential threat posed by an intoxicated motorist). 
139 See generally Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274 (2000) 
(discussing the methodology for establishing reliability of an 
anonymous tip alleging possession of a firearm). 
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details that are readily apparent, before initiating a traffic 
stop.   
 A.  Traffic Stops are Invasive Seizures 
 Contrary to the notion that an investigatory traffic stop 
is merely an inconsequential and limited intrusion, a mandatory 
police detention of a motorist is, in and of itself, an invasive 
seizure accompanied by the attendant impositions on one’s 
liberty.140  Just as when a police officer detains a person on 
the street, an investigatory traffic stop is a seizure within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.141  Thus, while the form of 
the interaction may differ, a traffic stop can similarly be an 
uncomfortable and inconvenient interaction in which the motorist 
                                                        
140 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979) (explaining 
that police initiated vehicle stops, like other mandatory police 
encounters, interfere with citizens’ liberty interests). 
141 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996) 
(“Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an 
automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and 
for a limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ 
within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment].”). 
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is subject to protracted public embarrassment.142  Consequently, 
the Court has recognized that a traffic stop, like a Terry stop 
and frisk, similarly interferes with one’s liberty interest to 
proceed without undue intrusion.143  Moreover, beyond the initial 
detention an investigatory traffic stop can readily transform 
into a further hands-on search and additional legal 
ramifications should the officer subsequently discover other 
indications of criminality during the stop.144  Accordingly, an 
                                                        
142 See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657 (commenting that traffic stops 
can be time-consuming, inconvenient, and angst-ridden forced 
interactions). 
143 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436 (1984) (“[A] 
traffic stop significantly curtails the ‘freedom of action’ of 
the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained 
vehicle.”); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657 (voicing that an 
investigatory traffic stop interferes with one’s freedom of 
movement and liberty). 
144 E.g., United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 724–25 (8th Cir. 
2001)(noting that the detaining officer’s discovery of a 
recently discarded paper bag containing crack cocaine lying next 
to a vehicle detained on the basis of an anonymous tip led to an 
extensive search of the car and subsequent arrests for 
possession of controlled substances); Harris v. Commonwealth, 
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investigatory traffic stop is sufficiently analogous to a Terry 
stop on the street as to warrant not treating anonymous tips 
about erratic driving differently than anonymous tips in other 
contexts. 
 B.  Bare-boned Information Provided Anonymously Cannot Be 
 Presumptively Reliable Without Adequate Corroboration  
 While an investigatory traffic stop must be warranted by at 
least a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity,145 a 
bare-boned anonymous tip about drunk driving does not by itself 
establish this level of suspicion because it neither indicates 
the informant’s credibility or basis of knowledge nor provides a 
way to verify its criminal allegations.146  Moreover, the fact 
                                                        
668 S.E.2d 141, 144 (Va. 2008) (explaining that the detaining 
officer observed signs of intoxication only after initiating the 
traffic stop, which resulted in an arrest for DUI). 
145 See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) 
(applying Terry standards to investigatory traffic stops); 
Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d at 144 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1 (1968)) (“An investigative stop must be justified by 
a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable 
facts, that criminal activity is ‘afoot.’”). 
146 See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000) (detailing that 
a bare-boned anonymous tip that contains no predictive 
 68 
that someone can provide a detailed description of a motorist 
does nothing to show that the tipster is actually privy to 
inside information about that motorist.147  Thus, because 
confirming the readily observable innocent information from a 
tip cannot demonstrate the tipster’s reliability in regards to 
the criminal allegations, this level of corroboration cannot be 
used as the sole basis for a Terry stop.148  To justify a seizure 
                                                        
information to show its source has inside knowledge lacks even a 
“moderate indicia of reliability”). 
147 See id. at 272 (stating a bare-boned anonymous tip may help 
locate a particular person but does not show the tipster’s basis 
of knowledge about alleged criminal acts); United States v. 
Martinez, 486 F.3d 855, 864 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that an 
unverified anonymous tip accusing a particular person of having 
weapons used in the commission of a violent crime but providing 
no predictive information did not establish reasonable suspicion 
to conduct a traffic stop).  
148 See J.L., 529 U.S. at 272 (stressing that an anonymous tip 
must be reliable in its allegation of illegality to establish 
reasonable suspicion, not just in its ability to identify a 
person); Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d at 145 (recognizing 
that predictive information must related to alleged criminal 
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exclusively on a physical description of a vehicle, its general 
location, or its direction of travel would be no more valid than 
a seizure based entirely on finding a person standing at a 
particular bus stop.149  Therefore, while an officer may use an 
anonymous tipster’s description of a particular motorist as a 
means to locate the accused individual, police cannot also 
presume the criminal allegations are true simply because they 
located someone matching that description.150  
 Additionally, to presume the veracity of an anonymous 
caller’s unconfirmed allegations would be to circumvent the 
already existing requirement that police objectively judge 
whether a motorist’s driving is sufficiently unusual to warrant 
                                                        
activity if it will be used to strengthen a tipster’s 
reliability or basis of knowledge). 
149 See J.L., 529 U.S. at 272 (rejecting corroboration of a 
matching physical description and location as grounds to conduct 
a Terry stop and frisk). 
150 See id. (explaining that police may use a tip’s description 
of a particular person to narrow their focus, but cannot use the 
accuracy of that description as a basis of suspicion about a 
criminal act). 
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a traffic stop.151  While a valid traffic stop must be grounded 
on facts that objectively suggest criminal behavior,152 an 
                                                        
151 See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226 (1985) 
(stating law enforcement may detain a vehicle where the 
officer’s suspicion of criminality is objectively reasonable 
based on specific and articulable facts); Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (articulating that an officer’s experience 
entitles him to draw specific inferences from the available 
facts); State v. Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516, 521 (Wis. 2001) 
(detailing that reasonable suspicion must be based on specific 
facts and inferences that objectively warrant a police officer 
to believe criminal activity is taking place). 
152 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (declaring that an officer may 
conduct an investigative stop if he “observes unusual conduct 
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his 
experience that criminal activity may be afoot. . . .”); United 
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 421–22 (1981) (applying Terry 
reasonable suspicion to the vehicle context); Harris v. 
Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d at 146 (discussing subjective versus 
objective indications of suspicious behavior); see also NAT’L 
HIGHWAY TRANSP. SAFETY ADMIN., THE VISUAL DETECTION OF DWI MOTORISTS:  
EXPLANATION OF THE 24 DRIVING CUES, 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/alcohol/dwi/dwihtml/cues.
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anonymous informant may subjectively view certain conduct as 
indicative of drunk driving that, when objectively considered, 
would fail to raise a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity.153  If police can rely on a bare anonymous report of 
erratic driving simply by locating a vehicle matching the 
description within a particular area, it bypasses the 
requirement that a stop be objectively reasonable and allows 
police to detain merely on the untested word of an unknown third 
party.154  Rather, a more appropriate use for these anonymous 
                                                        
htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (detailing common indicators 
used by law enforcement to identify possible motorist 
intoxication). 
153 See Harris v. Commonwealth, 688 S.E.2d at 146 (rejecting an 
argument that a motorist’s unusual behavior objectively 
indicated criminal activity); see also Anderegg, supra note 72, 
at 56 (“In the case of cell phones, the danger stems from the 
ease with which a police investigation can be set in motion 
based on what appears to be suspicious, but may ultimately turn 
out to be innocuous, activity.”). 
154 See Anderegg, supra note 72, at 54 (discussing the difficulty 
of discrediting an anonymous report of drunk driving when police 
do not independently corroborate the assertion); cf. York, supra 
note 30, at 195–96 (quoting United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 
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tips is to use them to direct the focus of law enforcement so as 
to put officers in a position to act should they independently 
observe suspicious behavior.155 
 C.  Anonymous Tips of Drunk Driving Do Not Warrant an 
 Extraordinary Danger Exception to the Reliability Analysis 
 Having established that a bare-boned anonymous tip about 
erratic driving would fail the traditional reliability analysis, 
the extraordinary danger exception suggested in J.L., which 
would automatically establish reasonable suspicion whenever an 
anonymous caller alleges drunk driving, similarly cannot be used 
to justify these investigatory traffic stops.  An anonymous 
allegation of erratic driving does not present such an immense 
                                                        
722, 724 (8th Cir. 2001)) (arguing against a corroboration 
requirement by suggesting that “[c]ourts should [] require that 
the informant allege behavior that amounts to an actual traffic 
violation.  For example, an allegation that a person is ‘driving 
like a complete maniac,’ standing alone, should be 
insufficient.”). 
155 Accord J.L., 529 U.S. at 272 (suggesting an anonymous tip can 
be used to locate the particular person who the tipster means to 
accuse). 
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danger as to excuse regular Fourth Amendment necessities.156  
Furthermore, such an exception would “rove too far”157 because it 
would be difficult to limit to just reports of intoxicated 
driving158 and would provide an outlet for invidious, 
consequence-free harassment of otherwise innocent motorists.159  
                                                        
156 See People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 818 (Cal. 2006) (Werdegar, 
J., dissenting) (dismissing the notion that crimes can be placed 
on a sliding scale in which the seriousness of the crime is 
inversely proportionate to the showing required for an 
investigatory stop and further arguing that drunk driving, while 
serious, is not “so great” as to warrant a reliability 
exception); cf. Wilson, supra note 57, at 229 (contending that 
allowing an extraordinary danger exception for bare-boned 
anonymous tips would entirely destroy Fourth Amendment 
protections). 
157 J.L., 529 U.S. at 272. 
158 E.g., State v. Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516, 527 n.10 (Wis. 
2001) (allowing traffic stops based on anonymous reports of 
either erratic or drunk driving). 
159 See McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Wyo. 1999) 
(considering potential for abuse in allowing reliance 
exclusively on anonymous tips asserting drunk driving). 
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As the Court declared in J.L., “the Fourth Amendment is not so 
easily satisfied.”160 
 1.  Drunk driving is inconsistent with the extreme   
 danger theorized in J.L.  
 While alcohol-related traffic accidents are unquestionably 
an issue of national concern,161 a single instance of drunk 
driving does not pose such an extraordinary danger as to justify 
a blanket exception from the showing of reliability.162  
                                                        
160 J.L., 529, U.S. at 273 (rejecting a categorical exception for 
firearms due to the ease with which an exception in one type of 
Fourth Amendment cases can be translated and applied to other 
subjects). 
161 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 
(1990) (“No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the 
drunken driving problem or the States’ interest in eradicating 
it.”).   
162 See People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 818 (Cal. 2006) (Werdegar, 
J., dissenting) (arguing the danger posed by a drunk driver is 
not so different from that posed by a concealed firearm to 
justify a different Fourth Amendment standard).  Further, the 
dissenting opinion notes the danger presented by an intoxicated 
motorist varies depending on environmental factors:  in this 
instance, the time of night and lack of other motorists 
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Jurisdictions that hold that DUI poses such an imminent danger 
as to fall within the theorized danger exception are confusing 
magnitude with frequency:  while the Court in J.L. spoke in 
terms of a danger “so great as to justify a search even without 
a showing of reliability,”163 the proponents of an erratic 
driving exception instead rely on statistical probability and 
rate of occurrence.164  Furthermore, advocates of such an 
                                                        
considerably diminished the risk of danger from an intoxicated 
driver.  See id. at 819 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).  The Supreme 
Court, while recognizing the risks created by intoxicated 
drivers, has declared that the crime of DUI cannot be considered 
a violent or aggressive crime.  See Begay v. United States, 128 
S. Ct. 1581, 1588 (2008) (holding that DUI is categorically 
different from the Armed Career Criminal Act’s meaning of a 
violent felony); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 10 (2004) 
(declining to categorize negligent drunk driving that causes 
serious bodily injury as a crime of violence that would 
constitute an aggravated felony under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act). 
163 J.L., 529 U.S. at 273.  
164 Compare id. (suggesting a danger may be so great as to 
justify a constitutional exception), with Brief of Mothers 
Against Drunk Driving as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
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exception assume, based on the frequency of alcohol-related 
accidents, that it is inevitable that an intoxicated motorist 
will cause an accident and consequently presume that the longer 
a motorist is on the road, the greater the likelihood they will 
crash.165  However, while every time a bomb is set off it will 
cause a destructive explosion, the same level of certainty is 
                                                        
supra note 80, at 4–7 (discussing the probability of 
alcohol-related vehicular accidents and the frequency of such 
accidents nationwide).  Despite the proponents’ contentions, 
evidence indicates traffic fatalities may actually be in 
decline.  See NAT’L HWY. TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS:  
2005 DATA:  OVERVIEW 1 (2005), 
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/810623.PDF (suggesting that a 
nationwide safety belt use rate of 82 percent and a three 
percent reduction in the rate of fatal crashes involving alcohol 
between 1995 and 2005 significantly contributed to a ten-year 
decline in the national traffic fatality rate). 
165 See State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 867 (Vt. 2000) (analogizing 
a possibly drunk motorist to a mobile bomb); Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari, supra note 15, at 24 (arguing against requiring 
police corroboration of alleged erratic driving by reasoning 
that the longer the officer waits, the greater the likelihood of 
an accident).   
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not present every time an intoxicated person gets behind the 
wheel of a car.166  Moreover, circumstantial factors such as 
time, location, presence of other vehicles, and attributes of 
the driver will affect the likelihood of injury, even presuming 
the motorist will crash.167 
                                                        
166 See Wells, 136 P.3d at 819 (Werdegar, J., dissenting) 
(reasoning that the danger posed by an intoxicated motorist is 
not constant, and largely depends on other factors such as time 
of day, location, and presence of other motorists); see also 
United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 736–37 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(explaining three possible outcomes when observing a potentially 
intoxicated driver:  the driver exhibits no erratic behavior, 
the driver exhibits erratic behavior that is harmless, or the 
driver exhibits erratic behavior that leads to injury). 
167 See NAT’L HWY. TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS:  2007 DATA:  
OVERVIEW 1 (2008), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/810993.PDF 
[hereinafter 2007 DATA] (describing categories in which 
alcohol-related fatalities were most common).  2007 statistics 
indicate that traffic fatalities were most likely for male 
drivers, those under the age of 25, drivers who were speeding, 
and motorists driving cars/light trucks.  Id. at 7, 10, 11.  
Alcohol-related fatalities most frequently occurred for drivers 
with a blood alcohol content of at least 0.08 g/dL, who were 
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 Additionally, while it may be true that waiting to observe 
erratic behavior could allow an accident to occur in the 
interim, this ignores the role that an anonymous tip can play 
even when further corroboration is required.  The Chief Justice 
lamented in his dissent from the denial of certiorari that 
allowing the decision below to stand meant police would not be 
able to initiate a stop on an anonymous tip, “even for a quick 
check,”168 which would likely lead to needless death.169  Yet, 
                                                        
speeding, and those between 21 and 24 years old.  Id. at 5, 7.  
Further, males were approximately three times more likely to be 
involved in a fatal crash than females, and were twice as likely 
to be legally intoxicated.  Id. at 11–12.  See generally RICHARD 
COMPTON & AMY BERNING, RESULTS OF THE 2007 NATIONAL ROADSIDE SURVEY OF ALCOHOL 
AND DRUG USE BY DRIVERS 1–2 (2009), 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/DOT/NHTSA/Traffic%20Injury%20Co
ntrol/Articles/Associated%20Files/811175.pdf (concluding that 
factors such as time of day, day of the week, vehicle type, as 
well as the age and gender of the driver, dramatically impact 
the likelihood a randomly selected driver will be legally 
intoxicated). 
168 Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 12 (2009) (mem.) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting). 
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this argument overlooks the fact that these anonymous 
allegations of criminal activity allow law enforcement to aim 
their attention at possibly intoxicated motorists of which they 
would otherwise be unaware.170  Therefore, while not directly 
justifying a stop, a bare-boned anonymous tip alerts police to a 
potentially intoxicated driver and allows them to observe the 
motorist and immediately initiate a stop once they see 
suspicious behavior.171  And certainly, should the motorist cease 
                                                        
169 See id. (implying requiring corroboration of anonymous tips 
will dramatically impact the safety of other motorists); see 
also Wheat, 278 F.3d at 736–37 (justifying a traffic stop based 
on an anonymous tip by noting that because police lack the 
option of a consensual encounter they must wait to observe 
erratic driving, which might allow an opportunity for an 
accident). 
170 Accord Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (suggesting 
an anonymous tip can be used to locate the particular person who 
the tipster means to accuse). 
171 See, e.g., State v. Lafond, 802 A.2d 425, 430 (Me. 2002) 
(upholding stop based on anonymous report of a possibly 
intoxicated motorist where the officer found a matching vehicle 
and observed it swerve and cross the white fog line before 
initiating the traffic stop). 
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driving while being observed, the officer would subsequently be 
free to initiate a consensual interaction.  
 Furthermore, there also does not appear to be a substantial 
difference in alcohol-related traffic fatalities rates between 
states that allow the use of anonymous tips as justification for 
a traffic stop and those that do not.172  In fact, even within 
states that permit traffic stops based solely on anonymous tips, 
the rate of alcohol-related traffic fatalities fluctuates 
annually, which suggests that relying on anonymous tips does not 
counteract other factors affecting the likelihood of a vehicular 
accident.173  At the national level, the rate of traffic 
                                                        
172 See NAT’L HWY. TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS:  RESEARCH 
NOTE:  FATALITIES AND FATALITY RATES IN ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED-DRIVING CRASHES BY 
STATE, 2007–2008 3 (2009), 
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811250.PDF [hereinafter CRASHES 
2007–2008] (stating that from 2007 to 2008, the alcohol-impaired 
driving fatality rate declined in forty states, remained 
constant in three, and rose in seven).  
173 Compare NAT’L HWY. TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS:  
RESEARCH NOTE:  FATALITIES AND FATALITY RATES IN ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED DRIVING 
CRASHES BY STATE, 2006–2007 3 (2009), 
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811099.PDF (indicating that 
between 2006 and 2007 the alcohol-impaired driving fatality rate 
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fatalities involving alcohol has largely been either stable or 
in decline over the last several decades, due to a variety of 
factors including demographics and widely-adopted legislative 
enactments, such as minimum drinking age requirements.174  
                                                        
in Kansas decreased 0.03 fatalities per 100 million vehicle 
miles traveled while New Hampshire experienced a decrease of 
0.09), with CRASHES 2007–2008, supra note 172, at 3 (showing that 
the alcohol-impaired driving fatality rate for Kansas rose 36.1 
percent from 2007 to 2008, while New Hampshire experienced a 40 
percent increase).  Kansas allowed traffic stops based on 
anonymous tips of erratic driving in 2003, while New Hampshire 
has allowed such stops since 2004.  See State v. Sousa, 855 A.2d 
1284, 1290 (N.H. 2004) (permitting stops based on anonymous tips 
of erratic driving when the caller provides sufficient detail 
and purports to witness the erratic behavior and police locate a 
matching vehicle in a short enough timeframe); State v. 
Crawford, 67 P.3d 115, 120 (Kan. 2003) (upholding stop based on 
anonymous report of dangerous driving). 
174 See 2007 DATA, supra note 167, at 1 (stating that in both 1997 
and 2007, approximately 30 percent of traffic fatalities 
involved alcohol); NAT’L HWY. TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
OF ALCOHOL-RELATED DRIVING TRENDS, 1982–2005 vii, 40 (2008), 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/ (follow “Traffic Safety” hyperlink; then 
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Collectively, this evidence suggests an extreme danger exception 
may be unwarranted in this context and calls into question the 
effectiveness of permitting reliance on anonymous tips about 
drunk driving. 
  2.  Drunk driving exception leads to a slippery slope  
  of other exceptions 
 Additionally, if an investigatory traffic stop is permitted 
to be based exclusively on an anonymous allegation of drunk 
driving, such an allowance cannot readily be limited to tips 
                                                        
follow “Impaired Driving” hyperlink; then follow “Statistical 
Analysis of Alcohol-Related Driving Trends, 1982–2005” 
hyperlink) (finding that alcohol laws, such as administrative 
license revocation or Minimum Legal Drinking Age 21, and 
demographics were responsible for significantly reducing the 
percentage of intoxicated drivers involved in fatal crashes 
between 1982 and 2005); NAT’L INST.’S OF HEALTH, FACT SHEET:  
ALCOHOL-RELATED TRAFFIC DEATHS 1, http://www.nih.gov/ (follow “Site 
Map” hyperlink; then follow “Research Results for the Public” 
hyperlink; then follow “Alcohol-Related Traffic Deaths” 
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (noting a 50 percent 
decline in alcohol-related traffic fatalities over the past 
three decades, due in part to adjustments in the legal drinking 
age and nationwide enactment of Zero Tolerance laws). 
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within that context.  In J.L., the Court stated that if a 
bare-boned anonymous tip about firearms could justify a Terry 
frisk, that reasoning would likely authorize police action in 
other instances where firearms are likely to be found, such as 
where a bare-boned anonymous tip alleges illegal drugs.175  The 
Court quickly pronounced that such inevitable lateral 
applications of the original exception would not satisfy the 
Fourth Amendment.176  In essence, the Court expressed concern 
that to allow such an exception would swallow the rule.177   
 To sanction reliance on bare anonymous allegations of drunk 
driving would also inexorably lead to the use of anonymous tips 
                                                        
175 See J.L., 529 U.S. at 273 (extrapolating that an exception 
for anonymous tips about firearms would lead to similar 
exceptions for drugs because many jurisdictions recognize that 
firearms and narcotics often go hand-in-hand). 
176 See id. (indicating that allowing anonymous tips about 
firearms to be used to rely on anonymous tips in other contexts 
would not satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment). 
177 See id. (speculating that allowing an exception in one aspect 
would inevitably lead to numerous other exceptions, thus 
defeating the purpose of the original rule). 
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in other analogous contexts.178  While many jurisdictions 
recognize that alcohol may be a major contributor to unusual or 
dangerous driving, they are also aware it is not the only 
factor.179  As explained by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin:   
To be sure, intoxication is not the only possible 
cause of erratic driving.  Erratic driving can be the 
result of something as innocuous as the driver waving 
at a bee in the car or something as serious as the 
driver having a heart attack.  But regardless of the 
cause, erratic driving can be very dangerous and often 
is symptomatic of intoxication.180 
                                                        
178 See, e.g., Anderegg, supra note 72, at 54 (stating that, in 
general, jurisdictions that permit traffic stops based solely on 
anonymous tips do not require a specific allegation of drunk 
driving, but rather any driving that can be characterized as 
erratic). 
179 See id. (commenting that jurisdictions allowing anonymous 
tips do not specifically require the caller allege that an 
erratic driver is drunk). 
180 State v. Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516, 527 n.10 (Wis. 2001) 
(justifying traffic stops based on allegations of erratic, 
rather than exclusively drunk, driving).  
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Thus, if an exception for anonymous tips alleging an intoxicated 
motorist is valid, certainly a tip simply alleging erratic or 
dangerous driving would suffice.181  Furthermore, if an anonymous 
tip of drunk driving is sufficient, it is reasonable to believe 
allegations of other behavior that similarly produce dangerous 
or erratic driving—such as text messaging while driving—might 
also justify a Terry stop.182  Consequently, allowing an 
exception due to the danger posed by potentially drunk drivers 
invites a multitude of other exceptions with no discernable 
endpoint:  a result specifically condemned by the Supreme 
Court.183 
                                                        
181 See id. (voicing that because erratic driving is dangerous 
and often indicative of intoxication, “an officer may make a 
traffic stop to investigate observations or reliable reports of 
erratic driving”). 
182 See Frank A Drews et al., Text Messaging During Simulated 
Driving, 51 HUMAN FACTORS 1, 5–6 (2009) (addressing behaviors that 
result from text messaging while driving, which leads to an 
increased likelihood of vehicle collisions, including:  slower 
reaction time, increased following distance, and inadvertent 
lane departures). 
183 See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273 (2000) (declining to 
create a firearms exception for bare-boned anonymous tips due in 
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  3.  Drunk driving exception would allow tipsters to  
  “lie with impunity”184 
 When a bare-boned anonymous tip asserting drunk driving is 
given enough weight to automatically permit police action it 
invites anonymous callers to “lie with impunity,”185 and can lead 
government agents to unintentionally harass or annoy innocent 
people.186  The Supreme Court has recognized that this threat of 
misuse significantly overshadows the unconditional acceptance of 
an anonymous tip based on the danger it alleges.187  While those 
in favor of allowing anonymous tips about drunk driving 
acknowledge this inherent risk of abuse, they argue it is 
outweighed by the need for preemptive action against the 
                                                        
part to the ease with which such an exception could be applied 
elsewhere). 
184 Id. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
185 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
186 See Harris v. Commonwealth, 688 S.E.2d 141, 146 (Va. 2008) 
(observing that the informant‘s anonymity meant he could not be 
subject to penalty for providing false information to police). 
187 See J.L., 529 U.S. at 272 (declining to adopt a firearms 
exception in part because of the potential for abuse). 
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imminent danger posed by a possibly intoxicated driver.188  
However, this erroneously assumes that as the danger alleged by 
a tipster increases, the more the tip should be considered 
presumptively reliable.189  As long as an anonymous tipster’s 
                                                        
188 See United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 735 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(admitting contemporaneous accounts of erratic driving may be 
completely fabricated to harass other motorists, but arguing 
that this risk is insufficient to prevent police from conducting 
investigatory traffic stops); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 
1077 (Wyo. 1999) (recognizing potential for abuse in anonymous 
tips of drunk driving).  But see Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 
1212, 1220 (Del. 2004) (reasoning that fabricated tips would be 
unlikely because it requires knowledge of a vehicle, its 
location, and its direction of travel, and requires police to be 
readily able to stop the vehicle). 
189 See Wilson, supra note 57, at 229–30 (arguing a extreme 
danger exception is logically flawed because “the more 
inflammatory and outrageous the 911 report, the more reliable 
the origin.”).  But cf. Bryk, supra note 3, at 280, 303 
(suggesting a sliding scale of reasonableness, in which inherent 
danger and the need for police corroboration are inversely 
proportionate, and concluding that an anonymous tip of an 
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credibility remains untested and they cannot be held accountable 
for the information they provide, there is an ever-present, 
unacceptable risk of falsified information.190  Rather than 
downplaying the likelihood of fabrication,191 jurisdictions could 
work to reduce the anonymity of tips, which would allow police 
to rely on the information while minimizing the potential for 
abuse.192  
                                                        
intoxicated motorist is sufficiently inherently dangerous to 
only require corroboration of basic descriptive information). 
190 See J.L., 529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(commenting that where an informant is completely anonymous, the 
chance tips will be fabricated is too great to be permitted).  
191 See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 13, Virginia v. Harris, 130 
S. Ct. 10 (2009) (No. 08-1385) (“[A]lthough the extent of prank 
calls of drunk driving is unknown, the fearsome toll taken by 
drunk drivers is all too obvious.”). 
192 See State v. Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516, 525–26 (Wis. 2001) 
(upholding stop based on anonymous tip in which the tipster told 
the police dispatcher his location in relation to the alleged 
erratic driver, remained on the phone until an officer 
responded, and then pulled his vehicle over after telling the 
dispatcher the officer was following the correct vehicle); id. 
at 528 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (acknowledging policies to 
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IV.  Proposal and Conclusion 
 Rather than attempting to distinguish anonymous tips about 
intoxicated motorists from tips in other contexts or create 
circumstance-specific exceptions to Fourth Amendment 
requirements, a more reasoned solution is to work to reduce the 
anonymity of anonymous tips about erratic driving.193  As Justice 
                                                        
ensure stops based on motorist’s tips are lawful, such as having 
police dispatchers asking the motorist to pull over at the 
scene); State v. Marks, No. MV99407373S, 2000 WL 33298878, at 
*5–6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2000) (validating stop based 
entirely on an anonymous tip because the unidentified tipster 
remained on the phone with police dispatcher for five minutes 
and “clearly relay[ed] his first hand observations” in extensive 
detail).  But see Anderson v. Dir., N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 696 
N.W.2d 918, 919 (N.D. 2005) (invalidating a stop in which a 
tipster reported and described a vehicle they were following 
that was being erratically driven and then stayed on the phone 
to provide updates to police).  The call here was not completely 
anonymous as police had a description of the tipster’s vehicle 
and witnessed the tipster’s vehicle pull over.  Id. at 923. 
193 See Lisenby, supra note 73, 183 (arguing that police should 
make reasonable attempts to establish a caller’s identity and 
further suggesting that the risk of fewer informants—due to the 
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Kennedy observed nearly ten years ago, police departments can 
employ a variety of means to reduce a source’s anonymity or 
bolster an anonymous informant’s credibility.194  Certainly, even 
greater technological resources are at the disposal of police 
officers today, and improvements to wireless technology might 
actually mean that anonymity could become a technological 
impossibility.195  Yet even in the limited circumstances where 
                                                        
fear of identification—is outweighed by ensuring officers 
conduct reasonable searches based on informants’ tips).  When 
the source of a tip is less anonymous, it is more likely their 
reliability can be ascertained and that the tip can be used to 
establish reasonable suspicion.  Cf. Wilson, supra note 57, at 
221–22 (reasoning that anonymous tips that are provided 
in-person allow for establishing credibility, demeanor, 
knowledge basis, and identity of the tipster). 
194 See J.L., 529 U.S. 275–76 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(suggesting ways to establish the identity or credibility of 
anonymous callers, such as caller identification systems, call 
logs and documentation systems, predictive information, and 
voice recorders). 
195 See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, WIRELESS 911 SERVICES, 
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/wireless911srvc.html (last 
visited February 20, 2010) (stating that approximately half of 
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anonymity cannot be eliminated,196 officers can use the tip to 
focus their attention and resources on a particular area and be 
on the lookout for suspicious driving.  Furthermore, it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that police, upon receiving an anonymous 
tip, ask general follow-up questions to learn the source’s 
                                                        
all 911 calls now originate from wireless phones and explaining 
that mandatory Enhanced 911 rules will allow a caller’s location 
to be pinpointed to within 300 meters); Press Release, Nat’l 
Highway Transp. Safety Admin., States and U.S. Territories 
Receive $40 Million in Grants to Improve 911 Services (Sept. 28, 
2009) http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/ (follow “NHTSA press room” 
hyperlink; then follow “Go To 2009” hyperlink; then follow 
“States and U.S. Territories Receive $40 Million in Grants to 
Improve 911 Services” hyperlink) (detailing a proposed 40 
million dollar grant authorized under the ENHANCE 911 Act to 
upgrade state 9-1-1 call centers to provide automatic location 
information for 9-1-1 calls originating from wireless and 
Internet-connected telephones). 
196 See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 15, 
at 29 (listing several circumstances in which tipsters will 
remain anonymous, despite technological advances). 
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identity or basis of knowledge.197  Thus, where police reduce the 
anonymity of tips they receive, they should be better able to 
rely on that information to initiate investigatory traffic 
stops.198  
 As Chief Justice Roberts commented, “[t]he conflict is 
clear and the stakes are high.”199  While this is true, the 
stakes should be considered as a need to combat the nation’s 
drunk driving problem in such a way that does not unreasonably 
interfere with the average citizen’s constitutional rights.  
Certainly, citizens should be encouraged to report erratic or 
dangerous motorists, and police should generally be able to act 
on those tips when they are sufficiently detailed.  However, 
                                                        
197 See Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 528 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) 
(recognizing the adoption of departmental policies designed to 
promote the reliability of anonymous tips about erratic driving, 
such as having police dispatchers ask motorists that are 
anonymously reporting erratic driving to pull over at the 
scene). 
198 See generally, State v. Sousa, 855 A.2d 1284, 1287 (N.H. 
2004) (discussing various mechanisms with which to increase the 
reliability of anonymous tips). 
199 Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 12 (2009) (mem.) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting). 
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there is a clear division of authority over the role of 
bare-boned anonymous calls to police about erratic driving, and 
the rationales relied on by the majority of states that allow 
reliance on such tips are illogical and inconsistent with Fourth 
Amendment precedent.  As such, the Supreme Court should hear 
this issue to resolve this discrepancy and provide a uniform law 
consistent with the traditional application of the Fourth 
Amendment:  when law enforcement cannot establish a caller’s 
credibility, they should be required to take the relatively 
minor step of corroborating the allegation to ensure there is a 
reasonable basis for a seizure before initiating an 
investigatory traffic stop. 
